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Installed and Operational Capacity Added (Megawatts)South Africa is suffering an electricity crisis. Blackouts have
been widespread and the impact disastrous. Electricity supply is
predicted to constrain growth for at least the next five years. How
could this have occurred when until recently South Africa had a surplus
of cheap electricity? This Development Viewpoint explores the causes.
The origins of the crisis stem from an ambitious electricity restructuring
and privatisation programme started in the early 1990s. The process
has been protracted, reforms have been difficult to implement
and the private sector has failed to respond. Meanwhile, public
investment has stalled; this is the main cause of the current crisis.
The focus of reform was on bringing market forces to bear
on the electricity supply industry. Eskom, the state utility,
was corporatised and in 2001, its core activities (the generation,
transmission and distribution of electricity) were separated, with
their finances ring-fenced.
The fragmented national distribution system was to be reorganized
into six electricity distribution companies, owned by Eskom and the
municipalities. Ultimately, the goal was competition and private
sector participation in distribution. However, this process has
involved complex legislation regarding the transfer of assets
and has been painfully slow. By 2005, just one company had
been created, only to be disbanded soon afterwards.
Crucially, policy uncertainty has contributed to a collapse in
investment, in some cases falling to 1-2 per cent of the asset base
rather than the desired level of 10 per cent. Lack of investment in
the distribution infrastructure is a key factor in the crisis. There are
now calls to drop the restructuring programme in favour of
strengthening the existing structure.
In generation, the restructuring programme also aimed to create
competition and bring in private sector participants. There was a
moratorium on investment by Eskom in order to prevent crowding
out of the private sector. In addition, public expenditure was
steered away from investment to boost the economy following the
removal of capital controls. There was, however, virtually no interest
from the private sector: investment in new generating capacity
dropped to zero between 2002 and 2006 (see Figure).
During the recent power cuts, a very high proportion of generation
capacity was out of service. During January 2008, for example, this
reached 23 per cent, mostly due to unplanned maintenance.
The Eskom plant is under severe strain due to factors such as poor
coal quality, staff shortages and a high load on its capacity. A vicious
circle has developed: a high proportion of plant is out of action, so
further strain is placed on the existing plant, which becomes even
more likely to break down.
Underlying the low level of plant availability in the longer term is
the lack of investment in generation capacity, which has stemmed
from unwarranted optimism in the willingness of the private sector
to invest. The result has been a fall in Eskom’s reserve margin
(the ratio of peak-load unused capacity to total capacity) from
more than 20 per cent to a precariously low eight per cent.
Because of this additional strain on the system, frequent outages
are inevitable. Similar reform packages have been repeated in much
of sub-Saharan Africa. But the ‘unbundling’ of the electricity supply
industry to facilitate private sector participation has failed to elicit
the critically needed investment (Bayliss and Fine 2008).
Across all developing countries, private sector investments in the
power sector declined from US$ 47 billion in 1997 to US$ 14 billion
in 2004. However, international advisors have continued to adhere
to the orthodox package of restructuring policies, claiming that
obtaining private sector investment is unavoidable because of
a widening ‘investment gap’ in the power sector.
Meanwhile, a dramatic and rapid scaling up of financing is required
in South Africa. Eskom plans to invest about US$ 44 billion over the
next five years to raise capacity in the energy sector. This is projected
to be financed by a combination of borrowing, price hikes and a
government loan of US$ 7 billion. But the additional capacity will
take several years to come on stream.
The electricity crisis of South Africa demonstrates that the
widespread efforts across developing countries to encourage private
sector investment in the electricity industry are unlikely to succeed.
So the government and state utility must continue to scale up public
investment in order to maintain and expand electricity capacity.
Reference:
Bayliss, Kate and Ben Fine, eds. (2008). Privatization and Alternative Public Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan
Africa. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Source: UBS Investment Research.
